We present a novel approach to improving the security of passwords In our approach, the legitimate user's typing patterns (e.g, durations of keystrokes, and latencms between keystrokes) are combined with the user's password to generate a hardened password that is convincingly more secure than conventmnal passwords against both online and offime attackers. In additmn, our scheme automatically adapts to gradual changes in a user's typing patterns while maintaining the same hardened password across multiple logms, for use m file encryption or other applications requiring a longterm secret key Using empirical data and a prototype implementatmn of our scheme, we give evidence that our approach Is viable m practice, m terms of ease of use, improved security, and performance
l Introduction
Textual passwords have been the primary means of authenticating users to computers since the introduction of access controls m computer systems Passwords remain the dominant user authentication technology today, despite the fact that they have been shown to be a fairly weak mechamsm for authenticating users Studies have shown that users tend to choose passwords that can be broken by an exhaustive search of a relatively small subset of all possible passwords. In one case study of 14,000 Unix passwords, almost 25% of the passwords were found by searching for words from a carefully formed "dictionary" of only 3 × 10 ° words [10] (see also [21, 4, 27, 29] ) This high success rate is not unusual despite the fact that there are roughly 2 x 10 TM 8-character passwords consisting of digits and upper and lower case letters alone
In this paper, we propose a technique for improving the security of password-based apphcatmns by incorporating binmetric information into the password Specifically, our technique generates a hardened password based on both the password characters and the user's typing patterns when typing the password. This hardened password can be tested for logm purposes or used as a cryptographm key for file encryptlon, wrtual private network access, etc. An attacker who obtmns all stored system information for password ver~caUon (the analog of the/etc/passwd file m a typical Unix environment) is faced with a convincingly more difficult task Permmsmn to make dlgffal or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee prov)ded that cop)es are not made or d)strlbuted for profit or commercial advent -age and that copies bear thts notme and the full citatmn on the first page To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to red)strlbute to hsts, requires prior specific permlss)on and/or a fee CCS '99 11/99 Singapore © 1999 ACM 1-58113-148-8199/0010 $5 O0 to exhaustwely search for the hardened password than in a traditional password scheme Moreover, an attacker who learns the user's textual password (e g., by observing it bemg typed) must type it like the legitimate user to log into an account protected by our scheme
There are several challenges to realizing this goal. The first is to identify features of a user's typing patterns (e.g, latencies between keystrokes, or duration of keystrokes) that the user reliably repeats (approximately) when typing her password The second is to use these features when the user types her password to generate the correct hardened password At the same time, however, the attacker who captures system reformation used to generate or verify hardened passwords should be unable to determine which features are relevant to generating a user's hardened password, since reveahng this reformation could reveal reformation about the characters related to that password feature. For example, suppose the attacker learns that the latency between the first and second keystrokes Is a feature that is rehably repeated by the user and thus is used to generate her hardened password Then this may reveal information about the first and second characters of the text password, since due to keyboard dynamms, some digraphs are more amenable to reliable latency repetitions than others.
Our approach effectively hides reformation about which of a user's features are relevant to generating her hardened password, even from an attacker that captures all system information. At the same time, It employs novel techniques to impose an additional (multiplicative) work factor on the attacker who attempts to exhaustwely search the password space. Using empirical data, we evaluate both this work factor and the reliabihty with whmh legitimate users can generate their hardened passwords Our empirical studies demonstrate various choices of parameters that yield both increased security and sufficient ease of use Our scheme Is very attractive for use in practice. Unhke other b]ometnc authentmation procedures (e.g., fingerprint recognition, retina or ins scans), our approach is unmtrusive and works with off-the-shelf keyboards. Our scheme initially is as secure as a "normal" password scheme and then adapts to the user's typing patterns over time, gradually hardening the password with biometrm information Moreover, while fully able to adapt to gradual changes m user typing patterns, our scheme can be used to generate the same hardened password indefimtely, despite changes in the user's typing patterns. Therefore, the hardened password can be used, e.g, to encrypt files, without needing to decrypt and re-encrypt files with a new hardened password on each logm.
The main limitation of our scheme is that a user whose typing patterns change substantially between consecutive instances of typing her password may be unable to generate her correct hardened password and thus, e g, might be unable to log in The most common circumstance in which this could happen is if the user attempts to log m using a different style keyboard than her regular one, whmh can cause a dramatic change m the user's typing patterns. In hght of this, applications for which our scheme is ideally suited are access to virtual private networks from laptop computers, and file or disk encryptlon on laptop computers Laptops provide a single, persistently available keyboard at whmh the user can type her password, which Is the ideal situation for repeated generation of her hardened password Moreover, with the rising rate of laptop thefts (e g, see [22] ), these apphcatlons demand security better than that provided by traditional passwords
Related work
The motivation for using keystroke features to harden passwords comes from years of research validating the hypothesis that user keystroke features both are highly repeatable and different between users (e g , [6, 28, 14, 15, 1, 9, 20, 24] ). Prior work has anticipated utilizing keystroke information in the user login process (e g, [9] ), and indeed products implementing this are being marketed today (e g, see http://www, biopass,word, corn/) All such prior schemes work by storing a model of user keystroke behavior m the system, and then comparing user keystroke behavior during password entry to this model Thus, while they are useful to defend against an online attacker who attempts to log into the system directly, they provide no additional protection against an offime attacker who captures system information related to user authentmation and then conducts an offime dictionary attack to find the password (e.g, to then decrypt files encrypted under the password). On the contrary, the captured model of the legitimate user's keystroke behavior can leak reformation about the password to such an attacker, as discussed in Section 1 Thus, our work improves on these schemes m two ways. First, our method is the first to offer stronger security against both onhne and offime attackers. Second, our scheme is the first to generate a repeatable secret based on the password and keystroke dynamics that is stronger than the password itself and that can be used in applications other than login, such as file encryptlon
The only work of whmh we are aware that previously proposed generating a repeatable key based on blometnc information is [3] In this scheme, a user carries a portable storage device containing (1) error correcting parameters to decode readings of the blometrlc (e.g, an Ins scan) with a limited number of errors to a "canonical" reading for that user, and (il) a one-way hash of that canonical reading for verification purposes Moreover, they further proposed a scheme in whmh the canonical blometrm reading for that user is hashed together with a password Their techniques, however, are inappropriate for our goals because the stored error correcting parameters, if captured, reveal information about the canonical form of the biometnc for the user. For this reason, their approach requires a blometrm with substantial entropy, e g, they considered iris scans offering an estimated 173 bits of entropy, so that the remaining entropy after exposure of the error correcting parameters (they estimated 147 bits of remaining entropy) was still sufficiently large for their application. In our case, the measurable keystroke features for an 8-character password'are relatively few Cat most 15 on standard keyboards), and indeed in our scheme, the password's entropy will generally dominate the entropy available from keystroke features. Thus, exposing error-correcting parameters m our setting would substantially diminish the available entropy from keystroke features, almost to the point of negating their utility Moreover, exposing information about the keystroke features can, in turn, expose information about the password itself (as discussed in Section 1) This makes the careful utilization of keystroke features cmtical m our setting, whereas in their setting, the biometrics they considered were presumed independent of the password chosen.
Our method to harden user passwords has conceptual similarities to password "salting" for user logm Salting is a method in which the user's password is prepended with a random number (the "salt") of s bits in length before hashing the password and comparing the result to a previously stored value [21, 16] As a result, the search space of an attacker is increased by a factor of 22 if the attacker does not have access to the salts. However, the correct salt either must be stored m the system or found by exhaustive search at logm time Intuitively, the scheme that we propose in this paper can be used to improve this approach, by determining some or all of the salt bits using the user's typing features. In addition, an advantage of our approach over salting is that our scheme can be effective against an online attacker who learns the legitimate user's password (e.g, by observing the user type it) and who then attempts to log in as that user.
Finally, we note that several other research efforts on password security have focused on detecting the unauthorized modification of system information related to password authentication (e g, the attacker adds a new account with a password it knows, or changes the password of an existing account) [13, 12, 8] Here we do not focus on this threat model, though our hardened passwords can be directly combined with these techniques to provide security against this attacker, as well
Preliminaries
The hardened passwords generated m our scheme have many potent,al uses, including user logm, file encryptlon, and authentication to virtual private networks However, for concreteness of expositmn, m the rest of this paper we focus on the generation and use of hardened passwords for the purposes of user login Extending our discussion to these other apphcatlons is straightforward.
We assume a computer system with a set A of user accounts Access to each user account is regulated by a login program that challenges the user for an account name and password. Using the user's-input and some stored information for the account a that the user is trying to access, the logm program either accepts or rejects the attempt to log into a. Like m computer systems today, the characters that the user types into the password field are a factor in the determination to accept or reject the logm. For the rest of this paper, we denote by pwd a the correct string of characters for the password field when logging into account a. That is, pwda denotes the correct text password as typically used m computer systems today.
In our architecture, typing pwd~ is necessary but not sufficient to access a. Rather, the logm program combines the characters typed in the password field with keystroke features to form a hardened password that is tested to determine whether login is successful. The correct hardened password for account a is denoted hpwd~. The login program will fail to generate hpwd~ if either something other than pwd~ is entered in the password field or if the user's typing patterns sigmficantly differ from the typing patterns dlsplab;ed m previous successful logins to the account Here we present our scheme m a way that maintains hpwd a constant across loglns, even despite gradual shifts m the user's typing patterns, so that hpwd a can also be used for longerterm purposes (e g, file encryptlon) However, our scheme can be easily tuned to change hpwd a after each successful logm, ff desired
Features
In order to generate hpwd a from pwd a and the (legitimate) user's typing patterns, the logm program measures a set of features whenever a user types a password Empirically we will examine the use of keystroke duration and latency between keystrokes as features of interest, but other features (e g, force of keystrokes) could be used if they can be measured by the logm program. Abstractly, we represent a feature by a function ¢ A x N ~ R + where ¢(a,g) is the measurement of that feature during the/-th (successful or unsuccessful) logm attempt to account a For example, if the feature ¢ denotes the latency between the first and second keystrokes, then ~(a, 6) is that latency on the sixth attempt to log into a Let m denote the number of features that are measured during logms, and let ¢1, .., Cm denote their respectwe functmns.
Central to our scheme is the notion of a dzstmguzshzng feature. For each feature ¢~, let t, C R + be a fixed parameter of the system Also, let #,, and aa, be the mean and standard deviation of the measurements ¢~(a,jl), , ¢~(a,3h) where 31, -,3h are the last h successful logins to the account a and h E N is a fixed parameter of the system We say that ¢, is a distinguishing feature for the account (after these last h successful logins) if I/Za, -t, I > ka~ where k E R + is a parameter of the system. If ¢, is a distinguishing feature for the account a, then either t, > #a, + ka~,, i e., the user consistently measures below t, on this feature, or t~ < #a~ -kaa,, 1.e , the user consmtently measures above t~ on thin feature
Security goals
In our login architecture, the system stores information per account that is accessed by the logm program to verify attempts to log m. This reformation ~s necessarily based on pwd a and hpwda, but will not include either of these values themselves This is similar to Umx systems, for example, where the /etc/passwd file contains the salt for that password and the result of encrypting a fixed string with a key generated from the password and salt In our logm architecture, the reformation stored per account will be more extensive but will still be relatively small
The primary attacker with which we are concerned is an "offline" attacker who captures this reformation stored in the system, and then uses thin reformation m an oflline effort to find hpwd~ (and pwd~) A first and basic requirement is that any such attack be at least as difficult as exhaustively searching for pwd a m a traditional Unix setting where the attacker has/etc/passwd. In particular, if the user chooses pwd a to be difficult for an attacker to find using a dictionary attack, then hpwd a will be at least as secure m our scheme A more ambitious goal of our scheme is to increase the work that the attacker must undertake by a considerable amount even if pwd a Is chosen poorly, i.e, m a way that is susceptible to a dictionary attack. The amount of additional work that the attacker must undertake m our scheme generally grows with the number of dmtmguishmg features for the account (when the attacker captured the system mformation) On one extreme, if there are no distmgmshmg features for the account, then the attacker can find pwd a and hpwd~ m roughly the same amount of time as the attacker would take to find pwd a in a traditional Umx setting. On the other extreme, If all m features are distingmshing for the account, then the attacker's task can be slowed by a multlphcatwe factor up to 2 m. In Sectmn 7, we describe an empirical analysis that sheds light on what thin slowdown factor m hkely to be in practice. In addition, we show how our scheme can be combined with salting techniques, and so the slowdown factor that our scheme achieves is over and above any benefits that salting offers.
A second attacker that we defend against with our scheme is an "online" attacker who learns pwd a (e g., by obserwng it being typed in) and then attempts to log in using it Our scheme makes thin no easmr and typically harder for thin attacker to succeed in logging m.
Overview
In this section we give an overview of our techmque for generating hpwd a from pwd a and user keystroke features When the account a is initialized, the mitiahzatlon program chooses the value of hpwd a at random from Zq, where q is a fixed, sufficiently large prime number, e.g, a q of length 160 bits should suffice The initialization program then creates 2m shares o {s~, s~ }l<~_<m of hpwd~ using a secret sharing scheme such that for any b E {0, 1} m, the shares b(~)~ s, B<~_<m can be used to reconstruct hpwd~ (Here, b(i) is the z-th bit of b.) These shares are arranged m an "instruction table".
The initialization program encrypts each element of both columns (i.e, the "< t~" and "> t~" columns) with pwd a This (encrypted) table is stored in the system. In the e-th login attempt to a, the login program uses the entered password text pwd' to decrypt the elements of the table, which will result in the previously stored values only if pwd a --pwd'. For each feature ¢~, the value of ¢,(a,~) indmates whmh of the two values in the i-th row should be used in the reconstruction to find hpwda: if ¢~(a,~) < t,, then the value in the first column is used, and otherwme the value in the second column is used. In the first logms after initialization, the value m either the first or second column works equally welt However, as distmgmshing features ¢~ for this account develop over time, the login program perturbs the value in the second column of row z if #a, < t, and perturbs the value m the first column of row , otherwise. So, the reconstruction to find hpwd a m the future will succeed only when future measurements of features are consistent with the user's previous distinguished features. In this way, our scheme helps defend against an onhne attacker who learns (or trms to guess) pwd a and then attempts to log into a using it. Unless this attacker can mimic the legitimate user'S keystroke behavior for the account's distinguishing features, the attacker will fall in logging into the account Moreover, numerous prior studies have shown that keystroke dynamics tend to differ significantly from user to user (see Sectmn 2) , and so typically the online attacker will fad m his attempts to log into a Thus, the security analysis in the rest of this paper will focus on the offime attacker Not any secret sharing scheme satisfying the propertms described above will suffice for our technique, since to defend against an offiine attacker, the shares must be of a form that does not easily reveal if a guessed password pwd ~ successfully decrypts the table. In the following sections, we present instances of our technique using two different sharing schemes Our scheme can be easily combined with salting to further improve security A natural place to include a salt is in the validation of hpwd a just after reconstructing it For example, when hpwd~ is generated during a logm, it could be prepended w~th a salt before hashing it and testing against a previously stored hash value The salt can be stored as is typmally done today, or may not he stored so that the system must exhaustively search for it [16] In this case, the extra salt results in an additional work factor that the oifflme attacker must overcome.
An instance using polynomials
In this section, we describe an instance of the technique of Sectmn 4 using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [25] In thin scheme, hpwd a is shared by choosing a random polynomial fa E Zq[x] of degree m -1 such that fa(0) = hpwd,~ The shares are points on this polynomial. We present the method m two steps, by first describing a simpler vanatmn and then extending it in Section 5.4 to be more secure against an offiine attack
Stored data structures and initialization
Let G be a pseudorandom function family [23] such that for any key K and any input x, GK(X) is a pseudorandom element of Z~. 1 In practice, a hkely implementation of G would be GK (x) ----F(K, x) where F is a one-way function, e.g., SHA-1 [26] There are two data structures stored in the system per account.
• An mstructwn table that contains "instructions" regardnag how feature measurements are to be used to generate hpwd~. More specifically, this instruction table contains an  entry of the • An encrypted, constant-size hzstory .file that contains the measurements for all features over the last h successful logms to a for some fixed parameter h. More speofically, if since the last time pwd a was changed, the login 1That is, a polynommlly-bounded adversary not knowing K cannot &stinguish between GK(X) and a randomly chosen element of Z~, even ff he as first allowed to examine GK (~) for many &'s of hm chmce and is allowed to even pick x (as long as it as different from every he prewously asked about) attempts 31, . ,3t to a were successful, then this file contams ¢~ (a, 3) for each 1 < i < ra and 3 E {3t-h+l,
,3t}
In additmn, enough redundancy is added to this file so that when it is decrypted with the key under whmh it was previously encrypted, the fact that the file decrypted successfully can be recognized This file is initiahzed with all values set to 0, and then is encrypted with hpwd~ using a symmetric cipher The size of this file should remain constant over time (e g, must be padded out when necessary), so that its size yields no information about how many successful logins there have been.
Logging in
The login program takes the following steps whenever the user attempts to log into a Suppose that this is the g-th attempt to log into a, and let pwd ~ denote the sequence of characters that the user typed. The logln program takes the following steps. Step ) or all values wall be dafferent. Second, though generated randomly, fa IS chosen so that fa(0) = hpwd a This ensures that hpwd a remains constant across multiple logms
Step 5 as also noteworthy, since at shows that whether each feature is d~stmgmshmg ts recomputed m each successful logm So, a feature that was previously dmtmgmshmg can become undistmgmshmg and wce-versa Th~s ~s the mechanism that enables our scheme to naturally adapt to gradual changes in the user's typing patterns over t~me
Security
Consader the "oiThne" attacker who obtains account a's hastory file and mstructmn table, and attempts to find the value of hpwd a Presuming that the encryptmn of the history file using hpwd a as secure, since the values o Y,~,, Ya~ are effectively encrypted under pwda, and since pwd a is presumably chosen from a much smaller space than hpwda, the easiest way to find hpwd~ as to first find pwd~ Thus, to argue the benefits of this scheme, we have to show two things First, we have to show that finding pwd~ is not made easmr m our scheme than at ~s m a typical envaronment where access is determined by testing the hash of the password against a prewously stored hash value. Second, we have to show that the cost to the attacker of finding hpwd a is generally greater by a slgmficant multlphcative factor That searching for pwd a is not made easmr in our scheme as clear The attacker has available only the instruction table and the encrypted history file. Since there Is a row m the instructmn table for each feature (not just those that are &stingmshing for a), and since the contents of each row are pseudorandom values, the rows reveal no reformation about pwd~ And, all other data available to the attacker is encrypted with hpwd,~
The more anterestmg security consideration in this scheme is how much security ~t achmves over a traditmnal password scheme. Suppose that the attacker captured the hmtory file and instructmn table after g _> h successful logms to a, and let d be the number of distinguishing features for thin account in the /~-th logan When guessing a password pwcY, the attacker can decrypt each field oLa~ and j3a, using pwd ~
{0, 1} m such that {(2i + b(~), y~ )}1<2<m interpolates to a polynomial ] with ](0) = bpwd~, ff and only ff pwd' = pwd a. Consequently, one approach that the attacker can take is to enumerate through all b C {0, 1} m and, for each ] thus computed, see if ](0) = hpwd~ (a e, ff ](0) will decrypt the history file). Thin approach slows down the attacker's search for hpwd~ (and pwd~) by a multlphcatlve factor of 2 m In practice, the slowdown that the attacker suffers may be substantmlly less because user typing patterns are not random. In Sectmn 7, we use empirical data to quantify the degree of security achieved against this form of attack, and show that at Is nevertheless substantial However, the attacker has potentially more powerful attacks against this scheme using the 2m points {(2i, ~0), (2z+ 1,.~,)}l<,<m, due to the following contrast On the one hand, ff pwd ¢ pwda, then with overwhelming probabflaty, no m + 1 points will lie on a single degree m -1 polynomial, i e, each subset of m points interpolates to a different polynomaal with a dafferent y-intercept (not equal to hpwda). On the other hand, ff pwd' = pwda, then there are 2m -d > m points that all lm on a polynomial f of degree m -1 (and f(0) = hpwd~), an partmular if d < ra, then there are at least m + 1 points that all lie on some such f. Asymptotically 0.e, as m grows arbitrarily large), it is known that the second case can be distmgmshed from the first an O(m 2) time if d _< (2-v/2)rn ~ .585m using error-correcting techniques [7] . These techmques do not directly break our scheme, since our anMysls in Sectmn 7 suggests that for many reasonable values of k, d will typacally be too large relative to m for these techniques to succeed (unless the attacker captures the account reformation before the account m used). Moreover, typacally m will be too small in our scenario for these techniques to offer benefit over the exhaustive approach above. However, because these techniques maght be amproved with apphcatmn-specific knowledge--e g, that m the second case, at least one of (2z, ~a°,) and (2i + 1, .~) hes on f--at is prudent to look for schemes that confound the use of error-correcting techniques. This ~s the goal of Section 5 4
A variation using exponentiation
In this sectmn we present a manor vanatmn of the scheme presented m Sections 5 1-5.2, to which we refer as the "original" scheme below. The scheme of this sectmn is more secure m several ways that will be described below.
Let p be a large prime such that computing discrete logarithms modulo p is computationally intractable (e g., choose p of length 1024 bits) and such that q davides p -1. Also, let g be an element of order q m Z~ The main conceptual differences In thin variation are that hpwd~ as defined to be gf,(o) mod p, and rather than storing C~a, and fla, in the instruction table, the values There are a number of reasons to prefer this vanatmn to the original m practice. First, this modified instruc-
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tlon table can yield no more information about ff~(0) to the attacker than that of the original, since the attacker can easily transform any instruction table in the original scheme to an instruction table for this variation by computing g~' rood p and gB~. mod p for each o~a~ and flat. Second, error-correcting algorithms such as [7] that offer faster-thanbrute-force attacks when m grows large and d is small do not directly apply to this variation, and we are unaware of any technique that the attacker can use to search for hpwd a faster than brute force. Third, as a practical matter, this variation seems to require the attacker to perform modular exponentiatlons per guessed password when conducting a dictionary attack. Since these are computatlonally intensive operations, this should slow the attacker's efforts even further This modification Imposes other changes to the scheme In particular, the job of determining hpwd~ from pwda and the feature measurements changes somewhat Moreover, rerandomizing the polynomial fa after each successful logm must be done a bit differently, since ff~(0) Is hidden even from the logm program The resulting logm process for the £-th logm attempt to a is as follows Let pwd' denote the sequence of characters that the user typed Step 4 Is again noteworthy In this case, ff, is determined by choosing a random polynomial .f of degree m-1 such that f(0) = 0 The polynomial f, is then ~mphcltly determined as f~ (x) = f(x) + logg (hpwd a), where the logarithm is taken mod p, due to the construction of 7'~, and (f'~, m Step 6 This roundabout method of re-randomizing fa in order to maintain the same hpwd a = giG(o) rood p is needed because the login program cannot compute logg(hpwda).
An instance based on vector spaces
In this section we briefly describe a second candidate instance of the technique outlined in Section 4 This solution addresses a potential weakness of the scheme of Section 5, namely that any m of the 2m values m the instruction table could conceivably be used to reconstruct hpwd a. That is, the attacker need not hmit his attempts at reconstructing hpwd a to those involving one value from each row of the table since, e.g., the topmost m values in the instruction table could be used to reconstruct hpwd~ if none of the first m/2 features are distinguishing It would seem that our technique could be strengthened if the secret sharing scheme used to populate the table would allow reconstruction only with one value from each row Here we present such a sharing scheme and corresponding instance of our method
In this method, hpwd~ is expressed as the determinant of a matrix over Zq, where q is chosen as m Section 5. Note that at initialization, and more generally when there are no distinguishing features, the "shares" in ..q,~ and _~, are the same (albeit encrypted under different outputs from Gp,do) This is reasonable since when there are no dlstingmshing features, our approach offers no additional security over that offered by pwd a anyway.
The logm process for the/~-th login attempt to a is as follows. Let pwd' denote the sequence of characters that the user typed. 
v-m= _~, Gp,a,(2i+l)-lmodq if¢,(a,£)>t~
The login program now holds m vectors {v_,}l_<,_<m 2 The login program sets hpwd' = det(vl,.. ,Vm ) modq. It then decrypts the history file using hpwd' If this decryption yields a properly-formed plaintext history file, then the logm is deemed successful (If the logm were deemed unsuccessful, then the logm procedure would halt here )
3. The logm program updates the data m the history file, computes the standard deviatmn Cra~ and mean #a, for each feature ¢~ over the last h successful logms to a, encrypts the new history file with hpwd' (1 e., hpwda) , and overwrites the old history file w~th th~s new encrypted h~story file. Step 5b so that they contain s~gmficant randomness and satmfy cond~tion (1) is as follows The logm program first chooses an 3Cond~tmn (1) ~s stronger than necessary Rather, using terminology introduced m Sectmn 77, ~t suffices that det(_ul bO) , , _u~ m)) rood q = 1 only for any b ~ {0, 1} ~ that extends the feature descriptor of this account However, we know a fast algorithm for computing (u,)~_<,<~ satisfying only the more restrmtive conditmn (t) ,.-, Era) is a random permutation matrix 0 e, the identity matrix with columns permuted randomly) subject to the constraint that If ¢~,. ,¢,d are the dlstmgmshing features for this account, then {K 3 }l<j <d = {e,j }153<d. In particular, this stlpulatmn ensures (with high probability) that v~°, ~ y.~ for each 1 <, < m when created m
Step 5b A property of this scheme is that when an offime attacker decrypts the instruction table with a candidate password pwd' to ymld vectors {~o, ~}1_<~_<~, the only combmatmns of these vectors that could conceivably yield hpwd~ are of the ^b (1) :,.b(rn ) "~ form det(v~l ,-",-~a~ J mod q for some b E {0, 1} TM. That is, not any combination of the m vectors holds the possibihty of generating hpwd a As m Section 5, the security of this scheme against an offline attacker depends most directly on how quickly the attacker can distinguish the cases pwd ~ = pwd~ and pwd ~ pwd~ When an attacker decrypts the instruction table with a password pwd ~ ¢ pwda, the result will be 2m random vectors. If pwd ~ = pwda, however, the table may have more structure For example, if pwd ~ = pwd a and there is only one dmtmguishing feature ¢~, then either ~o or ~_~ will be expressible as a linear combination of ~° 3 and ~3 for some 3 ¢ i (due to our constructmn of ul,.. ,um above) In general, whether there is enough addltmnal structure for the attacker to efficmntly exploit depends on the number and distributmn of distinguishing features
Empirical analysis
In order to evaluate the viablhty of our approach, we developed and deployed an experiment to collect password typing measurements from users. Specifically, we replaced the basic-auth function of a Netscape Enterprise Server 3 0 m active use with an implementation that uses a Java applet to record each user's keystroke features (keystroke durations and latencms between keystrokes) when typing her password On this web server, all privileged users use the same password to access the password-protected pages Thin provided an interesting case study, since it enabled a direct comparison of user typing behavior on the same password. The password used in this experiment has 8 characters (i e., m = 15), but because it is still in actwe use, we cannot disclose it here. At the time of this writing, login measurements have been recorded for approximately 11 weeks. For the discussion in this section, we use data gathered from the 13 users for which we have at least 4 logms recorded on her usual keyboard Our analysm employs only each user's logms from her usual keyboard, as reported by the user. In total, this analysis is based on 188 recorded logins.
The goal of our experiment is to empirically evaluate the number of distinguishing features for the average user, the entropy of users' distinguishing features, and the rehabihty of successful password entry. The number of distingmshing features for the average user is Important because the strength of our proposal is enhanced if the number d of distinguishing features for a user is large relatlve to the number m of features overall However, this alone is not enough to ensure that our scheme offers a significant increase m security. To see why, suppose for an extreme case that all users could be partitioned into "slow typmts" and "fast typists": slow typists have the property that for any of their distinguishing features ¢~, #a~ > t~ (where a is the user's account), and analogously fast typists have the property that #a, < t~ for all of their dlstmgmshmg features ¢~ Then, even if all of an account's features are distinguishing, the offilne attacker needs to examine only two possibilities upon guessing a password pwd': the values m the first column of the (decrypted) instruction table, and the values in the second column. Consequently, the entropy of users' distinguishlng features (defined below) is as important to our scheme as the number of distinguishing features. Finally, obviously the ability of a user to reliably generate her hardened password is important to the usability of our scheme.
We evaluated each of these facets for varying values of k, where a feature ¢~ is distinguishing if [#a~ --t~[ > kant (see Section 3 1) In general, a lower value of k increases the number of distingmshmg features per user and thus increases the sensitivity of logm to user typing patterns. On the other hand, a higher value of k makes it easier for the user to log in, but tends to decrease the number of distlngmshlng features per user. In addltmn, for slmphcity of presentation, in our evaluation we ignored the parameter h, I e, all of an account a's logms were used to compute p~, and a,,
Entropy due to keystrokes
Fundamental to our empirical evaluation is the measure of keystroke entropy we chose, which we now describe As described above, all users employ the same password in our experiments. Intuitively, our measure of entropy should capture the amount of remaining uncertainty there is in hpwd a for a randomly chosen account a We would like to compute the entropy of a randomly chosen account's feature descriptor However, this is comphcated by the fact that a feature descriptor may (and typically will) have undefined values. For example, suppose that )A I = m, that each account has only a single distinguishing feature, and that no feature is distinguishing for two accounts. Then, the Shannon entropy of a randomly chosen account a's feature descriptor would seem to be at least log m, due to the uncertainty m the position i of the account's dmtmgmshing feature (i e, ba(i) ¢ _1_). Nevertheless, an attacker knowing pwd a need only attempt to reconstruct hpwd~ using at most two different (total) feature descriptors, e.g, b such that b(i) = 0 for each 1 < z < m, and b such that b(~) = 1 for each 1 < z < m As a tool to better capture the entropy available due to keystrokes, we define a cover to be a function C : A ~ B such that C(a) is total for each a E A, and b~(i) 7 ~ ± ba(z) = C(a)(z). That Is, a cover maps each account a to a (total) feature descriptor that is identical to ba wherever ba is defined Given a cover, we can evaluate the entropy of C(a) under random choice of a, in a way that will be defined below. We then choose a cover that minimizes this entropy, and take this cover's entropy as "the entropy due to
keystrokes" This provides a more conservative evaluation of the entropy due to keystrokes, because multiple accounts can map to the same total feature descriptor under C So, in the example of the prevmus paragraph, all accounts can map to at most two such descriptors Guessing entropy [17] Intuitively, the guessing entropy is the expected number of feature descriptors in Img(C) an attacker would need to examine (and perform the corresponding reconstruction) to find hpwd a for a randomly chosen account a Moreover, this expected value supposes that the attacker knows the "weight" we(b) of each element in Img(C) and thus examines elements of Img(C) in an optimal order to minimize this expected value As described above, in the worst case an attacker will know Img(C) and wc for a cover C that minimizes Ec, and so It is this cover we use in our computations of Sectmn 7 2.
Results
Our analysis methodology consisted of the following steps for each value of k We first found values tdu~ and t)at that maximized the guessing entropy, when t~ = tdur for each duration feature ¢~ and when ti = tint for each latency feature ¢~. More specifically, for each pair of candidate integer values tdur, tint in the ranges 80 ms < tour _< 125 ms and 70 ms _< tint _< 140 ms, we computed the feature descriptor for each account and a cover C for these feature descriptors with mlmmum guessing entropy We then chose a pair tour, t)at that resulted in the highest guessing entropy from this calculation In this way, we captured the guessing entropy faced by the attacker in the case that the system was configured with optimal values of tdur, tint. The reliablhty of password logm was computed by calculating the percentage of each account's logms that would have succeeded for these values of tdur, ttat, and then averaging these percentages over all accounts If there were multiple pairs that ymlded the same maximum guessing entropy as computed above, then tdur, tint were chosen from among them as the pair ymldmg the highest reliability. The average number of distinguishing features d per user given k, tdor, and t)at was then computed.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 1 The smallest value of k studied was k = 0.4. This choice yields a guessing entropy of roughly 6 1, which is strong given the small number of users (13) in our study. (For this number of users, the maximum possible guessing entropy would be 7.) Moreover, this choice yields roughly 12.3 distinguishing features for the average account and an approximately 51 6% success rate for legitimate logins. That is, the expected number of attempts before a user succeeds in logging into her account is less than 2 If this reliability is insufficient, however, then increasing k to 1.0, for example, increases login reliability to 77 1% while retaining a respectable guessing entropy (2 8) and number of distinguishing features (7 7). Due to the computational expense of analyzing our data for values of k greater than 1 0, we cannot report results for these cases here. 
Implementation
We have implemented the method of Section 5 4 to experiment with our techniques further. [2] Our ]mplementation provides three types of functions initialization, login, and recovery. We have already described the first two of these functions in detail. The thEd, recovery, is intended for use in circumstances where the user finds herself unable to generate her correct hardened password after repeated attempts, due to a sharp change in her typing patterns We have shown in Sect]on 7 that this should be a rare occurrence for reasonable values of k, but it is nevertheless one that must be anticipated. The recovery program that we have ]mplemented is easily derived from the login program described in Section 5.4. the recovery program decrypts all instruction table entries using the password pwd a (provided by the user) and then exhaustively searches to find hpwd a (within time proportional to 2 TM) However, this recovery program should not simply be used as an alternative logln program, since ]t would enable an attacker who learns pwd a to generate hpwd a without having to recreate the legitimate user's keystroke dynamics. Rather, the use of this recovery program should be under tighter controls, e g, an administrator's. Other recovery techmques are possible, such as additionally storing the hardened password encrypted under a much stronger secret that can be accessed only with administrator assistance or with an additional hardware token
We have performed a battery of tests to evaluate the performance of the method in Section 5.4 These tests were run on a Dell Inspiron 3200 computer with a 266 MHz Pentram II processor running Windows NT Workstation 4 0 In these tests, q and p were 160 bits and 1024 bits, respectively Triple-DES in CBC mode was used to encrypt the history file The pseudorandom functmn family G was implemented as GK(X) = F(K,x) where F was SHA-1. The history length was h = 8 The number of measured features wasm-- 15 Of the three functions, the times reqmred for mitiahzation and recovery are highly variable. The time for initiallzatlon is overwhelmingly dominated by the time needed to generate p and q, whmh can he substantial but m our tests always completed m under one minute Since p and q can be generated once and then used for all accounts, this should not be a bottleneck m practice Recovery is'the other function with h]ghly variable delays Our implementation exhaustively searches through the 215 possible (total) feature descriptors, using each to attempt to generate hpwd a. The enumeration and testing of all 215 possibdltles completes in roughly 11 hours m the worst case.
In contrast to the times for imtiahzation and recovery, delays for successful and failed logms are v]rtually constant. Beginning when the user finishes typing her password, successful logms reqmre roughly 4.5 seconds to complete, and failed loglns complete in approximately 1 2 seconds The delay for a failed login is substantially shorter than for a successful one because a login failure causes most of the login steps to be bypassed
Conclusion
We have presented a novel approach for hardening passwords by explomng the keystroke dynamics of users. Our approach enables the generation of a long-term secret (the hardened password) that can be tested for logm purposes or used for encryptmn of files, entry to a virtual private network, etc. Our technique increases the time for an oflhne attacker to exhaustively search for thin hardened password (or the text password used to generate it), and can be used m conjunctmn with salting to slow the attacker further In addltmn, our approach improves security against an online attacker who learns the text password (e g, by observing it being typed) and attempts to login to an account protected by the hardened password As our prototype ~mplementatmn suggests, our techmque is viable for use in practice It adapts to gradual changes m a user's keystroke dynamics over time, while still generating the same hardened password. And, using actual keystroke data, we have given evidence that our scheme both improves upon the security of conventmnal passwords and Is easy to use by the average user. There remmns a small risk m our scheme that due to a sudden shift in typing behawor, a user will be unable to log into her account. Thin risk can be minimized if the use of our scheme ~s restricted to local logms on the same keyboard (e.g., on laptops). In additmn, our scheme can be coupled with recovery mechamsms, as we have described
For future work, we intend to validate our methods on a larger user population. We are also investigating the performance of our techmques when applied to other bmmetrics, partmularly other non-static bmmetrms such as voice, where features such as pitch and amplitude can be used in place of latencies and duratmns.
